Threat researchCisent
DigiCert: a network change without a security review left customer data exposed
Certificate authority DigiCert disclosed that an internal system was left open to the internet by mistake and that someone read its customers' data; certificates were not affected.

On Sunday, November 1, 2026, certificate authority DigiCert published the full report of unauthorized access to one of its internal systems: the one that archives the data its customers’ representatives provide to verify their identity. It published it on Mozilla’s Bugzilla, because the rules of Mozilla, Google Chrome, Microsoft and Apple require it to report these incidents.1
How it happened
- A network change: on February 4, 2025, during an infrastructure migration, the system was moved out of a network that could only be reached through a VPN and became accessible from the internet.1
- An open registration: an account creation feature meant for other uses was left available on that system by mistake. Those accounts didn’t go through multi-factor authentication and, although they were read-only, they could see the archived data.1
- A misread warning: on June 18, 2026, DigiCert’s team saw outside accounts on the system but concluded they had no access to data. Three days later, its security research program warned that accounts could be created from outside.1
- The access: someone read data between June 27 and July 2, 2026, the day DigiCert fixed the authorization. It confirmed this on October 19, three and a half months later.1
What was seen
- Mostly customer contact data: names, business emails and phone numbers, and business addresses.1
- For a minority of accounts, also a document with a name and address, such as a driver’s license, a passport or a utility bill.1
- The access could not write, approve validations or issue certificates. According to DigiCert, its certificate services, its customers’ credentials and the certificates it issued were not affected, and customers don’t need to do anything about their certificates.1
- DigiCert doesn’t say how many customers were affected. It does say it has already notified them and reported the incident to law enforcement.2
Why it took so long to see
DigiCert acknowledges three causes:1
- the migration was treated as an infrastructure change rather than a security change, so nobody reviewed what was left exposed;
- the system had no alerts for new accounts created from outside or for request volume;
- its permission model didn’t contemplate accounts created by anyone.
Its report leaves two lessons: a change in network access to an internal system must always go through a security review, and authorization can’t depend on where the system sits on the network.1
What to do
- Treat every network change to an internal system as a security change, with a review and a named owner, as DigiCert did after the incident.1
- Alert when accounts are created outside the approved workflow or when request volume rises. According to DigiCert, the volume alert it added in October would have fired on the July 1 traffic.1
- Check with an external scan which internal systems respond from the internet: it was the last task DigiCert closed.2
Where Cisent comes in
At DigiCert, the system was exposed for almost 17 months, and the access was confirmed three and a half months after it happened.1
Sentinel Defense detects, assesses and blocks attacks in real time alongside the EDR, the firewall and every connected source. A scan or a password campaign shows up while it’s happening, not months later. It acts on its own only where an action can be undone, such as blocking an attacking IP or an intrusive connection, and asks before anything with impact, such as isolating a machine.
Sources
DigiCert, full incident report on Mozilla’s Bugzilla, bug 2084460 (“DigiCert: Unauthorized access to business system”), November 1, 2026. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2084460↩︎
DigiCert, replies on the same Bugzilla bug, November 6 and 7, 2026. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2084460↩︎