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ScreenConnect: attackers used its panels to break into dozens of organizations

Huntress saw an attacker use ScreenConnect panels to install their own remote access on hundreds of computers, and ConnectWise points to third-party extensions.

On November 11, 2026, security firm Huntress saw an attacker use access to several panels of ScreenConnect, ConnectWise’s remote support tool, to send commands to groups of managed computers.1 The same day, ConnectWise published an advisory.1 In it, the company says it is investigating unauthorized access to the ScreenConnect environments of some of its partners, the IT providers that use it to manage their clients’ computers, and that it disabled several third-party extensions as a precaution.2

What Huntress saw

  • Starting at about 17:47 UTC on November 11, and within 90 minutes, at least 288 computers at 48 organizations that use Huntress were affected. A third were hit in the first 10 minutes.1
  • The commands installed a ScreenConnect client controlled by the attacker and a toolkit Huntress named SCKit.1
  • SCKit is built to spread: from the infected computer to the technician who connects to it, and from there to the other computers that technician can reach. Huntress says it has not seen that spread succeed so far.1
  • The activity appears to be related to RMM+, a third-party extension that lets another tool drive ScreenConnect sessions. RMM+ bypasses ScreenConnect’s accounts, roles and multi-factor authentication: it authenticates with a shared key stored in its settings.1
  • Its versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted an empty key if no one had set one.1

What ConnectWise says

  • It has found no evidence that its infrastructure was compromised, or that initial access used a ScreenConnect vulnerability.2
  • Its initial assessment is that the attacker may have abused third-party extensions installed in its partners’ environments. It says it is still validating that assessment.2
  • It found about 400 environments with at least one extension from the RMM+ family, and notes that having one installed does not mean being compromised.2
  • It disabled five extensions in those cloud environments: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link.2
  • It says version 26.6.5 of the ScreenConnect client, from September, blocks the technique SCKit uses to try to reach the technician’s computer.2

What to do, according to ConnectWise

  • Update every technician client to 26.6.5 or later, in the cloud and on premises: updating the console does not update those clients.2
  • Keep the listed extensions disabled. Anyone running ScreenConnect on their own servers has to disable them themselves.2
  • From a trusted device, end all ScreenConnect web sessions and identity-provider sessions, reset credentials and enforce multi-factor authentication. Changing a password does not end open sessions.2
  • Don’t use ScreenConnect to investigate or clean the affected computers; use the EDR or another trusted channel, and include the technicians’ computers that connected to them in the review.2
  • Review the authentication, extension installation, Run Command and Toolbox records.2

What is still unknown

  • Whether the way in really was an extension: ConnectWise says it is still validating that assessment.2
  • How many organizations were hit in total: the 48 are only those that use Huntress.1

Where Cisent comes in

According to Huntress, most of the RMM+ installations it found were legitimate: they were usually added for a project and left in place.1

Sentinel Red Team attacks the organization’s systems with its authorization and within the scope it defines, to find the gaps before an attacker does: the connected device running unsupported software, the admin panel reachable from outside, the vendor that manages it remotely. It’s ongoing testing, not one audit a year, and every new attack pattern helps train the defense.

Explore Sentinel Red Team

Sources

  1. Huntress, “SCKit Worm Installs Rogue ScreenConnect Clients and Session Cookie Relays Across Hundreds of Endpoints”, Huntress blog, November 12, 2026. https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect↩︎

  2. ConnectWise, “ScreenConnect security advisory: Precautionary extension disabling and partner guidance”, ConnectWise Trust Center, updated November 12, 2026. https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories↩︎